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Abstract: Control is pervasive in construction project environments. The management 
of projects through various planning and control tools has therefore been described 
essentially as rebureaucratization which increases control over individuals, teams and 
organizations through ideologies of efficiency and performativity. Yet, certain 
characteristics of the project setting make it an ideal climate for the empowerment of 
individuals and teams. The manifestations of control in five construction project 
management teams involved in two ongoing construction projects in Hong Kong are 
examined. The interpretive and exploratory focus of the study favoured the use of a 
qualitative research design and the case study approach in particular. Control is 
viewed as all devices and systems employed to ensure that acts, behaviours, outcomes 
and decisions of individuals, teams and organizations are consistent with meeting 
organizational or project goals, objectives and strategies. The findings indicate that a 
portfolio of control modes is implemented in project teams comprising both formal 
(i.e. behaviour- and outcome-based) and informal (i.e. clan- and self-based) control 
mechanisms which are not necessarily incompatible. While formal control remains the 
primary control mode, a portfolio of control appears necessary to augment the 
inadequacies of formal control due to the evolving nature of the project environment.  
Keywords: empowerment, formal control, Hong Kong, informal control, portfolio of 
control 
 
   
 
INTRODUCTION 
Empowerment represents a moral hazard dilemma for managers who grapple to 
reconcile the potential inherent loss of control with the fundamental organizational 
need for goal congruence (Mills and Ungson, 2003). Empowerment initiatives have 
therefore often failed to achieve the intended positive results because of 
management’s reluctance to give up control (c.f. Mills and Ungson, 2003, Simons, 
1995, Argyris, 1998, Dewettinck and Buyens, 2006). In the project context, some have 
argued that the management of projects through various planning and control tools is 
essentially rebureaucratization (Hodgson, 2004) which increases control over 
individuals, teams and organizations through ideologies of efficiency and 
performativity (Fournier and Grey, 2000). This is perceived as aspiring a new form of 
“iron cage” of project rationality (Cicmil and Hodgson, 2006). Contrary to this view, 
the site-based nature of projects characterised by complexity, uncertainty, poor 
communication (i.e. timing, extent and content), inadequate co-ordination (i.e. of 
organisations and activities) and inadequate integration (i.e. of tasks, organisations 
and personnel) provides an ideal climate for the empowerment of individuals and 
teams. 
Control is therefore often viewed as incommensurate with empowerment which 
emphasizes the expansion of employee autonomy and responsibility through the 
removal of control-oriented management approaches to create a work environment 
that permits employees to apply their full potential in the performance of tasks.  
However, recent empirical developments in the organizational and management 
literature actually depict empowerment as a form of control. In particular, 
 
   
empowerment is shown to manifest as self-control (c.f. Leifer and Mills, 1996, Kirsch, 
1996, Kirsch, 1997) which is not necessarily incompatible with other forms of control 
as some have surmised. This study therefore set out to explore the manifestation of 
control in construction project teams, by examining the extent to which a portfolio of 
control modes exists and how such control is exercised. In the sections that follow, a 
framework of control modes is advanced that incorporates empowerment as self-
control. The research design is subsequently outlined and the findings from the 
analysis of manifestations of control in five construction project management teams 
involved in two ongoing construction projects presented and discussed. Conclusions 
are drawn and implications for theory and practice outlined. 
DEVELOPMENT OF A CONTROL FRAMEWORK 
The organization and management literature views control as encompassing all the 
devices and systems employed to ensure that the behaviour and decisions of 
organizational constituents are consistent with the organization’s goals, objectives and 
strategies (Merchant and Stede, 2007, Flamholtz et al., 1985). A prominent organizing 
framework for the mechanisms (i.e. devices and systems) through which 
organizational control is exercised is Ouchi’s (1979) three control modes/types model, 
comprising market control, bureaucratic control and clan control. In the market 
control mode, premium is placed on the ability to precisely measure and reward 
individual contributors to a task as the means of control. Bureaucratic control relies on 
surveillance and close evaluation, built on the comparison of outcomes or behaviours 
with predetermined ones. Clan control relies on informal socialization, such as shared 
values, beliefs and norms, to eliminate goal incongruence.  
 
   
Kirsch (1996), however,  argued that Ouchi’s (1979) framework is incomplete when 
applied to complex and nonroutine tasks (e.g. construction projects) as it fails to 
account for ‘knowledge of task’ as a key determinant of type of control. 
Consequently, Kirsch (1996) dismissed market control as an inappropriate control 
mode in complex tasks contexts and proposed instead the addition of self-control, an 
appropriate mode of control when knowledge of task is high. This view resonates with 
the notion that construction is knowledge- and a professional-based industry, a 
characteristic which makes the project setting a suitable climate for empowerment 
(c.f. Dainty et al., 2002, Greasley et al., 2005, Walker, 2002). Kirsch (1996)  
described self-control as the scenario where one sets his/her own targets in relation to 
the needs of the organization or task, monitors his/her own behaviours and when 
necessary changes them in accordance with the self-set or agreed targets. Outcome-
based and behaviour-based controls, the two modes of bureaucratic control, are 
viewed as formal controls which attempt to restrict behaviours or outcomes while clan 
and self-control depict informal control modes which attempt to induce a value or 
belief change (Flamholtz et al., 1985). 
Table 1 summarizes the key characteristics of the four modes of control, as adapted 
from Nieminen and Lehtonen (2008) with additional information from prior studies 
(e.g. Eisenhardt, 1985, Kirsch, 1996, Kirsch, 1997, Leifer and Mills, 1996, Ouchi, 
1979, Sharma, 1997), and provides an organizing framework for studying control in 
project teams. Control in this context is viewed as encompassing all the devices and 
systems employed to ensure that acts, behaviours, outcomes and decisions of 
individuals, teams and organizations in project are consistent with meeting 
organizational or project goals, objectives and strategies (c.f. Merchant and Stede, 
2007, Flamholtz et al., 1985, Nieminen and Lehtonen, 2008). Control viewed in this 
 
   
manner, can be examined from different levels within the project context; the inter-
organization and the intra-organization levels. Interpolating an agency theory 
perspective (c.f. Eisenhardt, 1985) into the construction project context, attempts by 
the principal (i.e. client) to control the agent (i.e. contractors and consultants) is 
particularly pervasive. Controls that arise from this principal-agent relationship at the 
inter-organizational level often translate at the intra-organization level between top 
managers and the individuals and teams they deploy at the project-level and can often 
be a direct reaction to the inter-organization level controls.  
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
Design of the Study and Data Collection 
This study has an interpretive and exploratory focus as it seeks to examine how 
control manifests. Such a focus favours the use of a qualitative research design and the 
case study approach was particularly appropriate as it encompasses the holistic, in-
depth study of a phenomenon using a variety of data sources and procedures (Yin, 
2003). Case studies are most useful when the boundaries between phenomenon and 
context are not clearly evident as in the examination of the manifestations of control in 
this case. Two cases were selected for study; an infrastructure project (i.e. Project 
Alpha) and a building project (i.e. Project Beta). While the projects are comparable in 
some respects (e.g. construction methods employed i.e. high use of precast, 
government departments as client, design-bid-build element of their procurement, 
etc.), consistent with an attempt at literal replication (c.f. Yin, 2003), they also differ 
in two key criteria; project lifecycle at start of case study and the project 
delivery/procurement system in use. These two characteristics have been shown to 
 
   
induce substantial variation in the authority, control and responsibility structures 
within the multi-organizational project environment (c.f. Bryman et al., 1987, 
Newcombe, 1996, Rowlinson et al., 1993, Walker, 2002). The two projects therefore 
provided consistent, differentiated and ambiguous information rich settings for study 
that allowed the emergence and interplay of various other contextual factors. While 
the two projects were the primary focus of the study, the units of analysis were the 
five embedded project management teams of the contracting parties in the projects. 
Three data collection techniques were employed; documentary data analyses, 
observations and interviews. Documentary analysis was used to gain a deeper 
understanding of the projects and to identify project specific issues with control 
implications. Passive observations were undertaken at project meetings and site visits 
to capture authority, responsibility and control related issues in an emergent and emic 
manner. Indeed, Mangham (1986) asserts that the use of managerial language can 
reveal a number of aspects of power and control in ways which are rarely made 
explicit in other forms within organizations. The interviews elicited information about 
manifestations (incidents) of control (covering the range of control modes as 
discussed and presented in Table 1). A key component of the interviews was 
identifying the goals of key stakeholders and eliciting information on control 
mechanisms linked to the achievement of such goals. This was in recognition of 
purposive or goal directed nature of control (c.f. Kirsch, 1997). The Critical Incident 
Technique (c.f. Flanagan, 1954) was used to encourage respondents to recall control 
episodes on the project and to describe them in as much detail as possible. A total of 
30 semi-structured face-to-face interviews were conducted with team members (17 on 
Project Alpha and 13 on Project Beta), carefully selected on the basis of their critical 
roles as either controllers or controlees. The interviewees role descriptions on the 
 
   
projects included project manager, site agent, quantity surveyor, quality control 
manager, project architect, resident engineer, project clerk of works, etc. All but one 
interview were tape recorded and transcribed verbatim. One respondent in Project 
Alpha Client’s team declined to have the interview with him recorded, in which case 
only notes were taken. By employing three different data sources, convergence of 
information was achieved through triangulation. In particular, inconsistencies in 
information from one source (e.g. interviews) were clarified using data from the other 
sources (e.g. documentary analysis or observations). Thus, collaborative evidence on 
pertinent issues were obtained from multiple sources to assert their credibility. 
Background of Projects and Teams 
Project Alpha 
The project is an integral part of a 7.6 km long major highway infrastructure 
undertaking. The works comprise the construction of a 1.1 km elevated viaduct, dual 
three-lane carriageway (average 65m above ground) to connect a tunnel (under 
construction) on one end and a cable-stayed bridge (under construction) at the other 
end. The project is delivered under a traditional design-bid-build approach with a non-
contractual partnering arrangement in place. The contract is a re-measurement type 
with a price fluctuation clause and awarded for an initial contract period of 40 months 
and at an initial contract sum of HK$1,012 million. There are three primary project 
management teams; the client’s team (i.e. Client-Alpha), the consultant’s team (i.e. 
Consul-Alpha) and the contractor’s team (i.e. Contra-Alpha). The study of Project 
Alpha began about a year after the project started and lasted 30 months. 
The client (i.e. Client-Alpha’s parent organization) is a government department with 
responsibility for the planning, design, construction and maintenance of the public 
 
   
road system and railway networks with an average annual budget of about HK$4.6 
billion.  A team of 5 is assembled in-house to coordinate the client’s input into the 
project. The consulting engineer (i.e. Consul-Alpha’s parent organization) is a Hong 
Kong-based international engineering consulting firm with more than 60 years 
experience in the delivery of projects in the fields of building, civil engineering and 
industrial construction. Consul-Alpha team comprises The Engineer (i.e. responsible 
for design and overall contract administration) and a team of Resident Site Staff (RSS, 
i.e. responsible for site supervision). The contractor (i.e. Contra-Alpha’s parent 
company) is a joint venture between two Hong Kong-based French sister companies 
and a Chinese state-owned company. The companies brought together their enormous 
international expertise and local experience to forge a partnership. As part of the joint 
venture agreement, a Project Joint Venture Board was in place to oversee and provide 
the strategic direction for the effective delivery of the project.  
Project Beta 
The project is Phase 4 (of six phases) of a public-rental housing programme involving 
the construction of three 41-storey blocks, estimated to provide a total of about 2,300 
units of rental apartments. The value of the works is estimated at about HK$434 
million and is contracted out for an initial period of 36 months. The works are 
procured broadly under a traditional design-bid-build approach with a non-contractual 
partnering arrangement in place. Special conditions of contract cater for six work 
packages contracted under a Modified Guaranteed Maximum Price (MGMP) 
arrangement which collectively make-up about 31% of the contract sum. The study 
began slightly more than a year after the project started, and lasted 15 months. There 
are two primary project management teams in the project; the client’s team (i.e. Dual-
Beta) and the contractor’s team (i.e. Contra-Beta).  
 
   
The client (i.e. Dual-Beta Team parent organization) is a statutory body that develops 
and implements the government’s public housing programme. As a departure from 
previous practice, the development and procurement sub-division which mainly 
undertakes R & D related roles was chosen to implement the project, instead of one of 
the traditional project sub-divisions. The functional heads within the matrix design of 
the client’s organization nominated members to form the core project management 
team (i.e. Dual-Beta team). A site team was also put in place to undertake direct site 
supervision. The teams played a dual role as both consultant and client, responding to 
design issues and making the approvals often reserved for the client’s team in a 
traditional project set-up. The contractor (i.e. Contra-Beta’s parent company) is part of 
a diversified conglomerate and plays a leading role in property development, 
construction and materials supply. Their choice as contractor for Project Beta was an 
assertion of their role as one of the leading contractors in the public housing market 
with a reputation of excellence and quality in housing delivery.  
Data Analysis  
Analysis Strategy 
The data analyses followed Woolsey’s (1986) three-step guide for analyzing critical 
incident data. The first step was descriptive in nature, where all the information about 
a potential control mechanism was collated from the transcripts of interviews and the 
notes from the documentary analysis and passive observations. At this stage, 
inconsistencies in information from one source where resolved by double checking 
with that obtained from other sources to achieve convergence (as per the central tenet 
of triangulation). The identification of potential control mechanisms was facilitated by 
drawing on Kirsch’s (1997) criteria that control mechanisms are devices or systems 
that identify/specify or evaluate acceptable behaviours or outcomes of a controlee (i.e. 
 
   
individual, team or organization). In a second step, a descriptive label was applied to 
the detailed descriptions of the potential control mechanisms. The final step was the 
classification of the identified control mechanisms into the control modes framework 
outlined in Table 1. Thus, this stage of the data analysis followed the ‘framework 
analysis’ approach (c.f. Ritchie and Spencer, 1993) which facilitated the ordering and 
sorting of the mechanisms into the a priori framework in Table 1. The classification 
of the identified control mechanisms was on the basis of their nature, initiator, 
documentation status and evaluator as depicted in Table 2 in accordance with the 
work of Kirsch (1997) and Jaworski (1988). For example, if a mechanism specified or 
identified behaviours for the controlee (i.e. agent e.g. individual, team or organization) 
to engage in and was initiated by the controlee’s management or an external entity 
(i.e. principal) and formally documented, then such a mechanism was classified as a 
behaviour-based.  
Credibility and Trustworthiness Measures 
Credibility and trustworthiness are key issues in qualitative research and in case 
studies in particular. Demonstrating credibility and trustworthiness in the design and 
execution of qualitative research is particularly important in establishing confidence in 
the findings and conclusions drawn. Several measures were taken in the case studies 
and were mainly based on the recommendations of Butterfield et al. (2005); 
 Triangulation in the data collection: three sources of data were relied upon in 
each case study; documentary, observations and interviews. This enabled 
verification of emergent issues from multiple sources to achieve convergence. 
 Descriptive validity was ensured by working with verbatim transcripts of 
interviews, photocopied documentary evidence and notes and direct quotations 
as much as possible from the observations.  
 Interview fidelity was achieved through consistent application of the interview 
protocol but also probing as much as possible to discover the different 
perspectives of the interviewees.  
 
   
 Theoretical validity: This measure is demonstrated in the discussion of the 
case study findings, in a subsequent section, by reference to previous research 
to show how the emergent themes from the cases are consistent or 
inconsistent. The aim therefore is to demonstrate theoretical agreement and 
convergence with previous work. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
FINDINGS 
Control Dynamics in Project Alpha 
Client-Alpha Team 
The manifestations of control in Client-Alpha team were classified into the four 
control modes framework developed earlier. Due to space constraints, only excerpts of 
the matrix of the identified control mechanisms are presented in Table 3. The full 
matrix is reported in Tuuli (2009). The full lists of control mechanisms are, however, 
depicted in Tables 4, 5, 6 and 7. Interestingly, there is no manifestation of self-control 
in the Client-Alpha team. As a team from a government department, this is hardly 
surprising. Indeed, some of the Client-Alpha team members were described by 
colleagues in the Consul-Alpha and Contra-Alpha teams as seemingly uninterested in 
the project itself. Preferring a “quiet life” of no problems, no mistakes, issue free 
project and nice project reports. Such an apathetic attitude can therefore not promote 
proactivity which is an important ingredient for self-control to manifest. Behaviour-
based controls are primarily of surveillance nature (e.g. complaint walk, Electronic 
Document Management System, etc.) while others seek to achieve conformance by 
specifying acceptable behaviours or expected acts (e.g. contract and Project 
 
   
Administration Handbook). Outcome-based controls are exercised through 
mechanisms that specify limits or standards that are then monitored (e.g. approval 
limits on variation orders and project budget). Clan control mechanisms are shaped 
around the socialization of individuals, so as to create an environment in which 
individuals identify with collective goals, norms or values (e.g. mutual objectives and 
mission statement). 
 
Consul-Alpha Team 
As in Client-Alpha, behaviour-based controls in Consul-Alpha are exercised primarily 
as surveillance (e.g. site diary, Technical Audits, etc.) and conformance (e.g. role 
specification, RSS Manual, etc.) mechanisms. The outcome-based and clan controls 
identified in Client-Alpha are also exercised in Consul-Alpha. Unlike in Client-Alpha, 
however, self-control manifests in Consul-Alpha mainly in the form of proactive acts 
aimed at improving personal reporting and record keeping (e.g. weekly report, 
secondary filling system and tick-box checklist) as well as altruistic acts (e.g. volunteer 
training). 
Contra-Alpha Team 
Behaviour-based controls in Contra-Alpha team manifest primarily as surveillance 
mechanisms (e.g. independent checkers, reporting, programmes, etc.), conformance 
systems (e.g. progress meetings, consultant, operating guidelines, etc.) and guarantee 
mechanisms (e.g. insurance strategies, quality assurance, etc.). Outcome-based 
controls are exercised through mechanisms that are used to monitor the achievement 
of limits or standards (e.g. specifications, substandard work audits, etc.), targets (e.g. 
key dates, project budget, etc.) and guarantees to ensure the achievement of targets or 
 
   
standards or remedies paid in lieu (e.g. retention fund, liquidated damages, etc.). As in 
both Client-Alpha and Consul-Alpha teams, clan controls in Contra-Alpha comprise 
socialization interventions. However, here the socialization interventions were of 2 
kinds; those aimed at aligning goals, norms and values across the organizations in the 
project team (e.g. partnering, joint problem solving, informal events, etc.) and those 
aimed at aligning goals, norms and values within the organization (e.g. goal 
alignment, identity orientation, etc.). The latter were particularly important since 
Contra-Alpha is a joint venture, in which members from the different partners may 
still identify with their parent organization with the potential for self interest. Self-
control manifested as proactive use of alternative construction methods in which the 
contractor continuously searched for innovative methods of executing the works 
which are safer, more cost effective and less time consuming. 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
Control Dynamics in Project Beta 
Dual-Beta Team 
There were manifestations of all four modes of control in the Dual-Beta team. 
Behaviour-based controls are exercised through the structuring of systems and 
processes for effective monitoring or surveillance. The contract is used as the overall 
governance framework for relationships and responsibilities among the parties. This is 
supplemented with a structured dispute resolution system to mitigate disputes at 
source. Meetings, reporting and standard operating procedures are then used to 
monitor behaviours and actions as well as to achieve conformance. Outcome-based 
control manifests in the form of annual performance appraisals, whereby the 
performance of each team member is evaluated against pre-specified performance 
 
   
standards.  The specifications provide the standard for the quality of materials and 
level of workmanship expected. A project budget also provides a means of controlling 
expenditure on the project. Clan control mechanisms in Dual-Beta team include non-
contractual partnering, public pressure and rule following culture, which are 
exercised mainly through socialization processes that reinforce a sense of shared 
norms, values and goals.  Self-control mechanisms also manifests as proactive acts in 
response to changes in project circumstances. For example, design development 
workshops are instituted by the project architect in response to lengthy delays in 
design approvals, while revision of specifications is a measure to minimize spill over 
delays from changes in construction sequence. 
Contra-Beta Team 
All four modes of control also manifested in Contra-Beta. Behaviour control 
mechanisms are shaped around the structuring of systems and processes, so as to 
effectively monitor enacted behaviours (e.g. safety audits, wage protection schemes, 
etc.). Several outcome-based controls are also employed mainly to maintain standards 
(e.g. specifications, Independent Checking Unit, etc.), meet desired performance 
targets (e.g. mop-up, cost plan, etc.) and for quality assurance (e.g. preferential 
tendering, defects liability period, etc.). Several clan control mechanisms are also in 
place, shaped around socialization processes (e.g. partnering, corporate mission, etc.) 
and peer/public influence (e.g. peer recognition, public pressure, etc.).  Similarly, 
self-control mechanisms are shaped around two themes; proactive attitude in reaction 
to different or changing project circumstances (e.g. sequencing of construction works, 
MGMP packages, etc.) and the contractor’s strong desire to be an industry leader (e.g. 
CSR programme, etc.). 
 
 
   
Cross-Team Analysis of Control Mechanisms 
Behaviour-based Control Mechanisms 
Table 4 summarizes the behaviour-based control mechanisms in the teams across the 
two projects. Monthly progress/site meeting and contract are used in all the teams. 
This is not surprising as contracts provide the primary framework for shaping the 
relationships and responsibilities of individuals and teams in projects while meetings 
provide an environment to continually re-enact such relationships and roles. Several 
mechanisms are also used in teams in both projects and these mechanisms are 
primarily built around reporting on different aspects of the project (e.g. monthly 
progress/site meetings, reports, etc.), surveillance of enacted behaviours (e.g. 
consultant/site supervision team, project programme, etc.) and guarantees for 
performance (e.g. insurance strategies, quality assurance systems, etc.). Behaviour-
based control mechanisms are mainly team specific; and predominantly specific to 
teams in Project Alpha than teams in Project Beta. These team specific control 
mechanisms appear to be in response to peculiar project and team circumstances (e.g. 
MGMP, joint venture, project complexity, etc.). Behaviour-based controls are also 
used most in contractor teams than in client or consultant teams. From an agency 
theory perspective, this is less surprising as potential controllers of contractors or their 
teams can emerge from many sources including; her own organization’s team, project 
team, her organization’s head office, consultant, client and other external entities. 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
Outcome-based Control Mechanisms 
The comparison of the outcome-based controls across the teams in the two projects is 
shown in Table 5. As in behaviour-based control, contractor teams experience far 
 
   
more outcome-based control than client and consultant teams. Annual performance 
appraisal and project budget are used in all the five teams. Team specific mechanisms 
are exercised only in Contra-Beta team and are attributable mainly to the MGMP 
arrangement. Several mechanisms span teams in both cases. However, there are 
differences in the way some of the common mechanisms are exercised. For example, 
in Contra-Alpha priced bills of quantities covered all work sections while in Contra-
Beta only non-GMP works have priced bills of quantities. The MGMP packages are 
estimated and valued on an “open book accounting” mechanism. The 
maintenance/defects liability period in the two cases also committed the contractors 
differently. While Contra-Alpha is committed to rectifying defects of up to 1 year 
from substantial completion, Contra-Beta is committed for up to 2 years for all works 
and 10 years for structural related works.  
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
Clan Control Mechanisms 
As in behaviour- and outcome-based controls above, clan controls are dominant in 
contractor teams compared with that in client and consultant teams (see Table 6). 
Non-contractual partnering with a partnering charter/mutual objectives and joint 
problem solving are used as control mechanisms in all teams. Team specific clan 
controls manifest and are directly linked to peculiar project and team circumstances. 
Several mechanisms are also exercised in teams across the two cases in a very similar 
manner. For example, similar informal events aimed at promoting socialization 
through interaction are evident in teams across both cases (e.g. barbecues, dinner, 
etc.). The two contractor teams also target similar industry awards and recognitions 
(e.g. considerate contractor award). There are, however, project specific mechanisms 
 
   
spanning only teams in the respective projects (i.e. joint problem solving and 
nationality & culture in Project Alpha; and public pressure and team spirit in Project 
Beta). The mechanisms in Project Beta are a response to a commitment to achieve 
win-win outcomes for all parties while those in Project Alpha are a consequence of the 
multicultural teams assembled (i.e. both within and across organizations) and the 
publicity the project has received due to the innovative arrangements and its 
experimental status. 
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE 
Self-Control Mechanisms 
Table 7 depicts the self-control mechanisms across the 5 teams in the two projects. In 
accordance with the “rule following culture” that is evident in typically bureaucratic 
culture in government departments, no self-control mechanism manifests in Client-
Alpha team. It is apparent that both the organization culture and the apathetic mindset 
of some of the Client-Alpha team members are not supportive of self-control. 
Alternative construction methods/sequence of works is the only self-control 
mechanism common to the contractor teams across the two projects. This is hardly 
surprising as contractors normally have the flexibility and responsibility in deciding 
the best ways to execute the works on site. In both projects, such proactive changes in 
methods resulted in the works being undertaken more safely, faster and in a more cost 
effective manner. As Table 7 indicates, self-control mechanisms are predominantly 
team specific. In Contra-Beta in particular, the self-control mechanisms are a direct 
result of the built in flexibility in the procurement arrangement (i.e. MGMP). This 
ensured the contractor’s involvement in the design process and made it possible for 
the contractor to also try out some of her initiatives (e.g. CSR and R & D). Unlike 
 
   
Client-Alpha where self-control was not evident, Dual-Beta team had a proactive 
attitude.  A plausible explanation for the differences in the two teams even though 
they are both from government departments stems from the division of the client’s 
organization that Dual-Beta team originates and the fact that the team plays a dual role 
as client and designer. As the R & D section, the Development and Procurement Sub-
division has been in the forefront of the client’s innovative initiatives, some of which 
are actually being tested in Project Beta. A culture of proactivity seems to have been 
built into the way things are done which spurs a desire to succeed. Self-control 
therefore requires cultivation and appears to flourish in an organizational environment 
that is supportive. 
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE 
DISCUSSION  
The manifestations of control in construction project management teams were 
investigated by drawing on recent developments in management and organizational 
control theory. The findings confirm that a portfolio of control modes is implemented 
in project teams which include a combination of formal (i.e. behaviour- and outcome-
based) and informal (i.e. clan- and self-control) modes of control. The finding of a 
portfolio of control modes in this study is consistent with the extant case study 
findings (c.f. Badenfelt, 2007, Kirsch, 1997, Langfield-Smith, 2008, Nieminen and 
Lehtonen, 2008). A portfolio of control modes appears necessary in projects because 
formal modes of control are static in nature, as they tend to be built into the contract or 
agreements at the beginning of the projects and are often difficult or impossible to 
amend thereafter. Consequently, formal control can prove inadequate in dealing fully 
with the evolving nature of the project environment in which plans, targets and 
 
   
procedures are often not immutable but fluid and changeable. Formal controls can 
particularly become redundant when controllers are inexperienced or lack project-
related knowledge. For example, in Project Alpha the inexperience of the RSS in 
precast segmental viaduct construction and the use of the new generation launching 
girder meant that the RSS could not adequately check method statements and 
temporary work designs regarding the bridge construction. In Project Beta, the 
inexperience of the Independent Checking Unit in gabion wall design and construction 
led to considerable delay in granting approval to the contractor’s proposed design.  
The reactions to the two incidents of inexperience in the projects, however, illustrate 
two response modes often employed to address inadequacies in formal control modes. 
Controllers either design new formal control mechanisms or implement other control 
mechanisms to help in implementing the formal controls already in place. 
Alternatively, controllers invoke informal control modes which are more responsive to 
changing project conditions (see Table 1). In Project Alpha, the RSS tended to place 
much weight on the Independent Checking Engineer and the Check Certificates as a 
basis of either rejecting or approving the contractor’s designs. A combination of these 
formal modes ensured the effective control of the contractor. In project Beta, however, 
the Project Architect invoked self-control (i.e. informal control) in the form of Design 
Development Workshops to help iron out differences before proposed designs were 
submitted to the ICU. Evidently, it appears that there is no exclusive use of formal or 
informal controls in project teams, but a complementary application of both, although 
the primary control mode remains bureaucratic/formal control (c.f. Hodgson, 2002, 
Nieminen and Lehtonen, 2008). But how self-control thrives in the midst of so many 
behaviour-based, outcome-based and clan controls, however, is not easily explained. 
A plausible explanation is that project participants view formal control mechanisms as 
 
   
a necessary evil. As Adler and Borys (1996) argue, bureaucracy is not always coercive 
but can also be enabling. In support, Nieminen and Lehtonen (2008) recently found 
that some bureaucratic control mechanisms such as goal setting and project plans are 
seen by project managers to be so self-evident that they are no longer perceived as 
control mechanisms but a fundamental part of the natural work environment. Other 
plausible explanations of the manifestation of self control can be drawn from 
contextual factors such as project members’ personalities and the climate of the 
projects (e.g. the apparent “shared destiny” involved in the MGMP arrangement for 
the parties in Project Beta). Taken together, the coexistence of seemingly 
incompatible control modes as the findings suggests is, however, instructive and 
provides preliminary validation to the recent findings of Lambe et al (2009) that 
control and self-management do play a complementary role in impacting behaviours 
in teams.  
The analyses also show that the mechanisms through which control modes are 
exercised are not necessarily transferable from project to project or team to team. This 
is evident from the team and project specific control mechanisms used to exercise the 
different control modes. Even where similar control mechanisms exist in different 
teams or projects, they tend to be exercised quite differently. This is not surprising 
given that every project is unique, thus, requiring the design and implementation of 
control mechanisms that best meets its peculiar needs. This is evident in the use of 
priced bills of quantities, for example. The findings further show that more behaviour-
based, outcome-based and clan controls are exercised in contractor teams than in 
consultant and client related teams. Being the agent, (c.f. Eisenhardt, 1985), the 
contractor is typically a target of formal and clan controls from a myriad of sources. 
Incidentally, more self-control mechanisms manifested in Contra-Beta, a contractor’s 
 
   
team, than in any other team across the two projects and supports Nieminen and 
Lehtonen (2008) recent conclusion that “a high level of control in one mode does not 
require the level of other modes to be low” (2008, p. 71). Indeed, as in this study, they 
found that the level of self-control can be high even in circumstances where there are 
high levels of bureaucratic and clan control modes, especially where there is 
coherence and no obvious conflict among the control modes. 
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
Recent empirical developments in organizational and management literature provide a 
coherent theory of control that fully accounts for the range of manifestations of 
control in five construction project management teams involved in two ongoing 
construction projects in Hong Kong. A portfolio of control modes is exercised in 
project teams in which formal and informal control mechanisms are combined. While 
formal controls remain the primary form of control, they are often inadequate in 
dealing fully with the evolving nature of the project environment as they can become 
static or redundant. Informal control modes appear to provide a means of augmenting 
these inadequacies in a complementary manner.  
Taken together, these findings make significant contribution to theory and practice 
with implications worth highlighting. In accord with recent empirical work on control 
in project and programme teams (e.g. Badenfelt, 2007, Langfield-Smith, 2008, 
Nieminen and Lehtonen, 2008), this study advances control theory by providing 
preliminary validation to a four modes of control framework that offers greater insight 
into the manifestations of control in project teams and the mechanisms employed in 
the exercise of different modes of control. This therefore suggests that a broader and 
holistic view on control is required in project teams that is inclusive of the 
 
   
contributions of all stakeholders to project control. Such a focus should extend beyond 
the implementation of formal control modes and mechanisms by stakeholders to 
embrace the capacity of controlees to implement clan- and self-based controls. It is, 
however, important to caution against “groupthink”, a common consequence of high 
socialisation and cohesion in groups (c.f. Neck and Manz, 1994, Turner and Pratkanis, 
1998), in the use of or reliance on clan controls where the collective pattern of 
thinking and conformity pressures in the group result in ineffective decision-making 
and behaviours. For organizations and managers, the evidence of a portfolio of control 
this study provides, however, presents opportunities for more effectively controlling 
projects in a manner that accounts for the dynamic nature of the project environment. 
Thus, to effectively control projects, it is not a choice between formal and informal 
control but a question of how to foster a cohesive and coherent blend of both modes of 
control to maximize complementarity. Organizations and their leaders must therefore 
recognise that the control of projects is not only a function of what formal control 
mechanisms stakeholders put in place, but what informal control mechanisms those 
being controlled also put in place to augment the inadequacies of formal control. The 
lack of manifestation of self control in all teams and the fact that self control 
manifested more in some teams than others (e.g. in Contra-Beta and Consul-Alpha 
than in Dual-Beta and Contra-Alpha) is also instructive. That, the lack of self-control 
in Client-Alpha is in part attributable to the apathetic attitude of some team members 
suggests that not all individuals are comfortable with self-control, resonating a similar 
finding by Greasley et al (2008) regarding empowerment. The acceptance of self-
control may therefore require greater nurturing of the target individuals and teams 
through the creation of more supportive organizational environments. 
 
   
However, since generalisation of the findings in the case studies to other settings is 
limited, the opportunity to test the four modes of control model and indeed, the notion 
of a portfolio of control, in a variety of contexts is a fertile avenue for other 
researchers. Future studies may also focus on exploring the drivers and consequences 
of the different modes of control as well as the strategies required in implementing a 
coherent portfolio of control modes in project teams. 
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Table 1: Conceptual Framework of Control Modes and Control Mechanisms 
Characteristics 
Formal/Bureaucratic Control  Informal Control 
Outcome-based  Behaviour-based   Clan-based  Self-based 
Focus of control Outcomes; 
results 
Behaviour; 
actions 
 Values, beliefs Self-regulation 
Basis of control Rules, 
surveillance 
Rules, 
surveillance 
 Shared values, shared 
norms 
Self-monitoring 
Source of control Organization or 
External Parties 
Organization or 
External Parties 
 Group members, 
associations 
Individuals, 
groups 
Ideal conditions 
for use 
Task outcomes 
are known and 
measureable; 
explicit link 
exists between 
extrinsic rewards 
and producing 
outcomes  
Knowledge of the 
transformation 
process; 
behaviour 
observable; 
explicit link 
between rewards 
and behaviours 
 Imperfect knowledge of 
the transformation 
process; immeasurable 
outputs; behaviour 
observable; rewards 
linked to values 
Imperfect 
knowledge of 
transformation 
process, 
immeasurable 
outputs, low 
behaviour 
observability 
Examples of 
control 
mechanisms 
Performance 
standards, 
targets, etc. 
Codes of conduct, 
contracts, 
handbooks, etc. 
 Mission statement, core 
values, peer pressure, 
culture, norm. 
Autonomy, 
decision-making 
power, intrinsic 
motivation, etc. 
Source: Adapted from Nieminen and Lehtonen (2008). 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Classification Criteria of Control Mechanisms 
Nature  Initiator  Documentation Evaluator Classified Mode 
Behaviour Principal Formally documented Principal Behaviour-based 
Outcome Principal Formally documented Principal Outcome-based 
Behaviour or 
Outcome Clan Not formally documented Clan Clan-based 
Behaviour or 
Outcome 
Agent Not formally documented Agent or Principal  
(BUT Agent’s initiative) 
Self-control 
Source: Adapted from Kirsch (1997).
 
   
 
Table 3: Excerpts of the Control Modes and Control Mechanisms in the Five Teams 
Mode Mechanisms Description Controller Controllee Level 
Behaviour-based  Dispute Resolution System  Dispute Resolution Advisor, adjudication committee 
and arbitration.  
Project Team* Dual-Beta/ 
Contra-Beta 
Inter-
organization 
 Open Book Accounting Covers GMP packages and gives the client full access to 
all costs information. 
Client Contra-Beta Inter-
organization 
 Electronic Document 
Management System 
(EDMS) 
The system scans and centralises all incoming and 
outgoing correspondences, providing a full document 
history that can be traced and monitored.  
Project Team* Client-Alpha/ 
Consul-Alpha/ 
Contra-Alpha 
Inter-
organization 
 Referable Decisions The Engineer requires the client’s “no objection” to 
several decisions before final approval to the contractor 
can be given (e.g. extension of time to key days, claims 
exceeding HK$ 300,000, etc.).  
Client 
 
Consul-Alpha Inter-
organization 
Outcome-based  Mock-up-Sample Wing All works in one floor are completed using pre-
approved quality of materials and standard of 
workmanship as standard. 
Client Contra-Beta Inter-
organization 
 Project Budget The project has a budget with a contingency sum. Head Office** Dual-Beta/ 
Contra-Beta/ 
Client-Alpha/ 
Consul-Alpha/ 
Contra-Alpha 
Intra-
organization 
Clan-based  Non-contractual Partnering 
Arrangement 
A commitment to partnership to resolve problems 
jointly is enshrined in a charter. 
Project Team* Dual-Beta/ 
Contra-Beta/ 
Client-Alpha/ 
Consul-Alpha/ 
Contra-Alpha 
Inter-
organization 
Self-control Design Development 
Workshops 
Used in an ad hoc basis to discuss contractor’s proposed 
designs and sequence of construction prior to 
submission to Independent Checking Unit (ICU).  
Project Architect Dual-Beta/ 
Contra-Beta 
Inter-
organization 
 Six Day Cycle The contractor’s target is to complete the building works 
of each floor in six days.  
Contra Contra-Beta Intra-
organization 
 Secondary Filling System A secondary filling system on specific issues that seem 
to recur is kept. 
Senior Resident 
Engineer  
Consul-Alpha Intra-
organization 
Notes: *The multi-organization project team comprising all sub-teams of the participant organizations on each respective project. **The Head Office of each respective team/organization.
 
   
 
Table 4: Cross-Team Comparison of Behaviour-based Control Mechanisms 
Control Mechanismsa 
Project Alpha  Project Beta 
Client Consul Contra  Dual Contra 
Complaint Walk √ √ √    
Monthly Progress/Site Meeting √ √ √  √ √ 
Electronic Document Management System  √ √ √    
Technical Audits √ √ √    
Contract √ √ √  √ √ 
Project Administration Handbook √ √   √  
Reporting √      
Referable Decisions  √     
Financial Matters Meeting  √ √    
Site Diary  √ √    
Monthly Progress Report  √ √  √ √ 
Nature of RSS Employment  √     
RSS Manual  √     
Correspondence Management  √     
Contract Staff Status of RSS  √     
Role Specification  √     
TTA Non-compliance Intervention  √ √    
Consultant /Site Supervision Team   √   √ 
Independent Checking Engineer   √    
Environmental Protection Measures   √    
Interim Valuation and Payment   √   √ 
Project Programme of Works   √   √ 
Quality Assurance Certification   √    
Report on Contractor’s Performance   √   √ 
Insurance Strategies   √   √ 
Quality Assurance System  √ √   √b 
Safety Audit   √   √ 
Temporary Transport Arrangement   √    
Programme of  Works   √    
Induction of New Employees   √    
Monthly Project JV Board/Management Meeting   √   √ 
Launching Girder Operating Guidelines   √    
Project Joint Venture Board   √    
Management System   √   √ 
Weekly Reports to Project JV Board/Head Office   √   √ 
Safe Behaviour Awards   √   √ 
Dispute Resolution System     √ √ 
Wage Protection Scheme      √ 
Final Account Settlement      √ 
Selection of Subcontractors-GMP works      √ 
Open Book Accounting      √ 
Gain Share Arrangement      √ 
Handbooks and Manuals      √ 
Selection of Subcontractors- Non-GMP works      √ 
Notes: aAn “√” under any team indicates the control mechanism is used in the team. 
 bIn Contra-Beta, this is actually a clan control mechanism. Thus, this is only for comparative purposes. 
 
 
   
 
Table 5: Cross-Team Comparison of Outcome-based Control Mechanisms 
Control Mechanismsa 
Project Alpha  Project Beta 
Client Consul Contra  Dual Contra 
Approval Limits on Variation Orders √ √     
Annual Performance Appraisal √ √ √  √ √ 
Prevention of Substandard Works Audit/PASS  √ √   √ 
Project Budget √ √ √  √ √ 
General and Particular Specifications   √   √ 
Priced Bills of Quantities    √   √ 
Key Dates /Sectional Completion   √   √ 
Maintenance/Defects Liability Period   √   √ 
Retention   √   √ 
Pay for safety   √   √ 
Liquidated & Ascertained Damages Clause    √   √ 
Promotion and Recognition/Bonuses and Pay Rise   √   √ 
Cost Management System   √   √ 
Variations on Non-GMP Works      √ 
Mock-up-Sample Wing      √ 
Independent Checking Unit       √ 
Modified GMP      √ 
Preferential Tendering Arrangement      √ 
Design Development Workshops     √b √ 
Bulk Purchasing      √ 
Target Accident Rate Per 1000 Workers      √ 
Notes: aAn “√” under any team indicates the control mechanism is used in the team. 
 bIn Dual-Beta, this is actually a self-control mechanism. Thus, this is only for comparative purposes. 
Table 6: Cross-Team Comparison of Clan Control Mechanisms 
Control Mechanismsa 
Project Alpha  Project Beta 
Client Consul Contra  Dual Contra 
Non-contractual Partnering Arrangement √ √ √  √ √ 
Mutual Objectives/Partnering Charter √ √ √  √ √ 
Joint Problem Solving √ √ √  √ √ 
Informal Events √ √ √   √ 
Nationality & Culture √ √ √    
Mission Statement/Corporate Mission √     √ 
Peer Recognition & Awards   √   √ 
Goal Alignment   √    
Identity Orientation   √    
Top Management Attitude   √    
Public Pressure     √ √ 
Organization Culture √    √  
Team Spirit     √ √ 
Selection of Project Team Members     √  
Certification and Memberships   √b   √ 
Leadership      √ 
Training      √ 
Safety Culture      √ 
Notes: aAn “√” under any team indicates the control mechanism is used in the team. 
  bIn Contra-Alpha, this is actually a behaviour-based control mechanism. Thus, this is only for comparative purposes. 
 
   
 
Table 7: Cross-Team Comparison of Self-Control Mechanisms 
Control Mechanismsa 
Project Alpha  Project Beta 
Client Consul Contra  Dual Contra 
Personal Weekly Report  √     
Secondary Filling System  √     
Tick-box Checklist  √     
Volunteer Trainers  √     
Alternative Construction Methods/Work Sequence    √   √ 
Design Development Workshops     √ √b 
Revision of Specification     √  
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Programme      √ 
Involvement in Design of Works      √ 
MGMP Packages Design      √ 
Six Day Cycle      √ 
Safety Initiatives in Plant Operations      √ 
Notes: aAn “√” under any team indicates the control mechanism is used in the team. 
  bIn Contra-Beta, this is actually a outcome-based control mechanism. Thus, this is only for comparative purposes. 
